Overview
Something I noticed back in the AACW days, incompetent generals (both grognard and RL) would focus on powerful forts as pivotal defensive positions for their armies, aiming to fight grand battles over them. Competent generals would recognize forts as a way to modify the terrain and create operational opportunities.
Forts & Blockhouses
Personal anecdote time. About twenty years ago, I was staying with some friends in Romney, WV (just west of Harpers Ferry). They own a large farm which has been in the family for generations. One day I pointed to an imposing building on a nearby hilltop and asked “Thats an odd-looking barn, what’s it used for?” I was told “That’s just the Civil War fort, the local kids use it for a playground.” My friends’ kids showed me around and told me that it was built and used by the federal garrison from Cumberland. The structure in question isn’t on any historical map or mentioned in any Civil War literature that I’ve seen . . . and I’ve seen hundreds of mentions of forts, blockhouses, batteries, camps, arsenals, garrisons, etc. most of which have been reduced by time to mere historical markers. It made me wonder, how many of these mini-forts were there?
All the forts in my latest screenshot just have the minimum garrisons, and the corps I use to build them have no integral troops, they only command other forts. The forts are effectively stationary divisions that don’t disappear when they’re not in command of anything else. This can be likened to the blockhouse system that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Rosecrans, Crook, Hurlbut, and others used to protect their supply lines from the likes of Forrest, Mosby, and Wheeler.
I currently organize them into one army (which I name a department to differentiate it from a field army) for each state, with a corps (bureau) for each cluster of 3-6 forts. There’s no reason it has to be done like that, it’s just barely manageable that way. One thing to watch out for, forts should be sited far enough apart that laying siege to one fort won’t automatically drag other garrisons into the battle. If you give your enemy the chance to conquer two or three forts at a time, he will do it where and when it’s most inconvenient for you.
That said, four game rationales for trying this style:
1. The latest patch slows progress in enemy territory. Speed bump blockhouses can slow it further, making it easier to isolate and destroy huge AI mercenary armies. They significantly restrict raiding opportunities for smaller forces.
2.Officer Management
- Every politically connected and/or incompetent general can be given a corps command over a group of forts
- Every political and/or incompetent field officer can have command of a single fort
- Competent officers can use these positions as stepping stones to avoid feuds while rising to higher rank & prominence
- This style also makes identifying the most competent available officers for field armies easier
3. Employing every available politically connected officer provides significant gains in political support.
4. This play style produces significant numbers of experienced low-manpower specialist corps (one commander, plus a few staff and/or cadre drawn from local garrisons on an ad-hoc basis):
- engineering corps to quickly build an effectual telegraph system
- intelligence corps for scouting
- loyalty corps or home guards (bushwhackers) to enforce civilian support
- raiding corps to lower enemy morale and production
- and occupational corps to take undefended territory
If you want more low-manpower corps, you can divide the forts into smaller groups (or build more forts). Rear-echelon armies & corps can be easily converted to competent field armies, facilitating any needed transfer of manpower across the map.